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Abstract
The use of social norms has become the tool of choice for behaviourally informed interven-
tions. However, it is still not clear for what type of contexts and populations is this interven-
tion effective. This randomised controlled trial with 4298 students tests the applicability of
social norms to improve the late payment of university tuition fees. We find that providing
information to late payers does not increase their likelihood of paying. This finding highlights
how the use of social norms may not always be an effective tool in influencing behaviour.
Introduction
The use of descriptive social norms has increasingly become the tool of choice for behaviou-
rally-inclined policy-makers and administrators. The idea is simple: inform people how many
other people are doing an activity—and if the proportion is high—the remainder will be more
likely to conform. The idea was initially tested by Cialdini and colleagues [1, 2] in a series of
experiments involving litter and messages left in hotel rooms to encourage guests to recycle
their towels [3]. The use of norms has been tested in a variety of contexts and behaviours,
including encouraging people to settle fines and taxes, with a series of successful trials carried
out by the UK tax authority [4], as well as trials on recycling and charitable giving [5, 6, 7].
One question that arises is the extent to which the use of descriptive social norms can be
applied to a wider range of domains and populations. This study tests whether providing feed-
back on norms of university tuition fee payment encourages late-paying students to settle their
fees. Students are often new to university so may not be aware of the norms of payment and, as
a result, might underestimate the level of fee payment across the university. We hypothesised
that late paying students are more likely to pay their fees if they are informed of the typical
behaviour of other students; but we found that providing this information was not effective in
improving the rate of payment of tuition fees.
In this paper, we briefly review the literature on social norms and the underlying theoretical
framework, and set out the rationale and design of the study. We then report the results and
discuss their implications for the research on social norms.
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Research on social norms
Humans are social beings who take behavioural cues from those around them. These cues are
derived from social norms—common practices driven by shared beliefs about what is typical
and appropriate behaviour. These informal understandings of rules emerge from cultural and
social contexts and indicate how to behave in society; but they do not necessarily involve active
reflection, as they are often unconsciously internalised [8, 9, 10].
There are two kinds of social norms, descriptive and injunctive. Descriptive norms are the
perception of what people do and injunctive norms are what people approve or disapprove of
[1]. Here we focus on descriptive norms with the assumptions that most people want to adhere
to how the majority of people behave and tend to emulate the behaviour of people with per-
ceived shared characteristics or where social distance is thought to be low [11].
In the case of private behaviours—like paying tuition fees—a large number of people act
independently and don’t necessarily communicate their behaviour to others. This information
asymmetry can then result in an individual being unaware of the normative behaviour and
erroneously assume a different behaviour. The supply of the correct norm can then allow the
individual to make a more informed choice. In this way, the supply of norms can be under-
stood as a moral expectation that people aim to live to up [12], which can from a game-theo-
retic perspective facilitate the coordination of interactions [13].
Over the past decades, numerous studies have shown that the use of social norms can lead
to behaviour change. One of the first applications of this approach was by Cialdini [1], who
reduces littering using descriptive norms by varying the amounts of litter on the floor and using
injunctive norms by placing handbills with different messages on cars’ windshields. In another
famous study, messages left in hotel rooms in the U.S.A. indicating how many other people
have recycled their hotel towels reduced the likelihood of guests asking for new towels [3].
There has also been an increasing use of social norms in public policy. Tax collection, in the
UK and US in particular, has been at the forefront of using social norms to improve payment
compliance. Messages using local norms of how many people pay tax significantly increase the
numbers of late payers paying their tax [4, 14, 15]. Social norms have shown to be effective in
several other contexts, including reducing prescription of antibiotics [16], curbside recycling
[5], charitable giving [6], and energy consumption [17].
Despite most of the research in this area supporting the impact of social norms on beha-
vioural change, there is some evidence that social norms are not always effective. In some cases,
the provision of descriptive norms alone can highlight that a considerable number of people
are, in fact, getting away with the non-normative behaviour, which reduces the effectiveness of
the message [2]. Interventions based on average behaviours that inform people that they behave
better than average can also result in a worsening of behaviour, as exemplified by energy conser-
vation studies in which those with low levels of energy consumption increase their consumption
after being informed that their average consumption is lower than their peers [18, 19, 20].
The effectiveness of social norms is also affected by the context of the interventions. For
example, two studies of hotel towels, which were carried out in Europe [21, 22], failed to repli-
cate the results of Goldstein et al [3]. As Bonher & Schlu¨ter [23] highlight, these results may be
due to different baseline behaviours: while norms may be effective in a North American con-
text where the baseline is lower, in Europe where the baseline is higher the effectiveness of the
intervention is attenuated.
In summary, while the majority of published social norm studies show a positive impact in
shifting behaviour [24], a closer reading suggests they are not always effective and that context
matters. As Dolan et al ([25], p. 2) argue, ‘the impact of norms on behaviors such as charitable
giving and productivity might be quite different to that of other behaviors such as resource use.
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The key difference in these behaviors is understanding the production function of the behavior’.
In other words, the findings of existing social norms studies do not show external validity to
all venues and contexts, in spite of many published and unpublished studies showing positive
results [24]. Thus, it is important to test the effectiveness of social norms interventions in a
broader set of contexts. In this study, we test the hypothesis that providing feedback on the
average payment rates of university tuition fees as part of a payment reminder will encourage
late paying students to settle their fees to the university.
Materials and methods
The study was designed and carried out at University College London (UCL), with the assis-
tance of the Student Fees Office. The project was approved by UCL Research Ethics Committee
(ID:3949/004). Consent was not obtained from the participants. Following the recommendation
of UCL’s Research Ethics Committee, we sought permission from the student representative
body, UCLU, to conduct the study.
The Fees Office sends out a reminder email to the students who have not paid their fees on
time. The intervention kept the existing wording of the reminder email but inserted the sen-
tence in bold “OVER 90% OF UCL STUDENTS HAVE ALREADY PAID. PLEASE PAY
THE AMOUNT DUE NOW.” which appeared in a prominent place near the top of the email
(see Appendix for the full text of the treatment and control emails). We ran a two-arm trial
over two years with the Fees Office sending reminders in four rounds of emails in November
2013, February 2014, November 2014, and February 2015 to unique late paying students of
each round (no subjects appeared twice in our data). The control was the normal email, but
adjusted so that the only difference between the treatment and control was the insertion of the
new text. The allocation of treatment was randomised and blocked by age and gender to
ensure balanced samples. The original sample includes a total of 4374 emails sent, from which
76 emails were removed from individuals who were in debt twice over the two-year period of
the study, and as result received two emails. We removed the 2nd email from the final analyses,
after checking that receiving the treatment email twice had no significant effect on the pay-
ment rates (β = 0.25 [-0.92;1.42], p = 0.67). The final sample included 4298 individuals who
were sent 812 emails in November 2013, 1459 emails in February 2014, 652 emails in Novem-
ber 2014, and 1375 emails in February 2015.
Table 1 shows the characteristics of the sample, which is balanced across treatment and
control for all the variables that we have available. We analysed the data controlling for rounds,
Table 1. Descriptive statistics by control and treatment group on year, round (1st round-November;
2nd round-February), gender, age and initial amount of debt.
Control Treatment
N N
Year 2013/14 1135 1136
Year 2014/15 1000 1027
November (1st Round) 732 732
February (2nd Round) 1403 1431
Male 1046 1045
Female 1088 1118
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)
Age 27.1 (7.9) 27.0 (7.9)
Initial Debt £3789 (£3244) £3710 (£3232)
Total 2135 2163
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0177354.t001
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year, gender, age, and the amount of initial debt. The experiment was powered to detect a
treatment effect of 5% in line with other studies using social norms to increase payment rates.
We were not able to conduct a manipulation check to understand how the different mes-
sages affected the students. However, there was a surge in payments the following day after
both the control and treatments emails were sent (27% of all payments occurred by the follow-
ing day with the rate rapidly declining after the first few days), suggesting that students do read
the emails and take action.
We use logistic regression models, with a binary outcome measure of payment by 14 days
of reminder being sent, to estimate the effect of the intervention. The interpretation of the
results is the same if OLS models are used (results from OLS models are available upon request
to the authors). We first use a univariate model with only the treatment predictor and then use
a multivariate model including covariates for gender, age, initial amount of debt, year (2013/
2014 or 2014/2015), and round of reminders (November or February). The model specifica-
tion is the following:
Pi ¼ aþ b1Si þ b4Xi þ ui
Where Pi is a binary outcome measure set to 1 if a student pays the tuition fees debt 14 days
after the reminder email is sent.; α is a constant; Si is a binary treatment indicator set to 1 if stu-
dent is randomly allocated to receive a social norm email, and 0 if receiving the control email;
Xi is a vector of individual specific characteristics, including gender, age, debt amount, year,
and month of the email (only present in model 2); and ui is an error term. We present the mar-
ginal coefficients in Table 2, where β is the impact of being in the group receiving the social
norm letter.
Results
As Table 2 shows, we find no significant effect of receiving the modified social norm email on
the payment of the tuition fees when compared to the normal control email. This non-significant
Table 2. Effect of intervention on payment of tuition fees. Model 1 shows logistic regression coefficients
for treatment effect and Model 2 also includes covariates for gender, age, initial amount of debt, year (2013/
2014 or 2014/2015), and round of reminders (November or February).
(1)
Univariate
(2)
Multivariate
Treatment -0.027
(0.061)
-0.034
(0.063)
Female (ref. Male) - 0.121
(0.635)
Age - -0.035 ***
(0.004)
Debt Amount - 0.000
(0.000)
2014/15 - 0.105
(0.064)
February (ref. November) - 0.904 ***
(0.070)
Constant 0.274***
(0.044)
-1.053 ***
(0.196)
Observations 4298 4296
Baseline probability: 0.43
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0177354.t002
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result remains when including covariates in the analysis on gender, age, amount of debt, year,
and round (Table 2). We also tested for the sub-group effects on gender, age, amount of initial
debt, rounds, and year by running interactions of each factor with the treatment, but found no
significant effect of treatment on any of the sub-groups. The payment rates over time also do not
change between control and treatment emails (see Appendix, Fig 1).
We find that younger individuals are more likely to pay their late fees after receiving the
reminder than older individuals. Individuals are also more likely to pay when receiving the 2nd
round emails in February compared to the 1st round in November.
Discussion
We find no impact of the use of social norms on the likelihood of payment of late university
tuition fees. This study is a rare example of an intervention providing normative information
that failed to change behaviour.
Below we propose a few potential explanations. Social norms are more likely to be effective
in stable and homogeneous populations in which normative behaviour can provide a cue of
what is the most efficient behaviour in a specific context. For example, providing the social
norms of late tax payment at the local level were more effective in increasing the payment rate
than providing the norm at the country level [4]. In contrast, the sample of our study—univer-
sity students—is a heterogeneous and temporary population that may result in individuals not
being influenced by normative information. In particular, students attending a London-based
university come from a variety of countries and ethnic groups, especially at post-graduate
level.
Whilst we find older students were less likely to pay on time, the intervention had no effect
on any age group. However, the mean age of our sample is still lower than most of other social
norm studies, which may indicate that the impact of this type of social interventions is less
effective on younger people. The sample of late payers is also unusual as the majority of stu-
dents get their fees paid automatically through their student loans, and as result are not part of
Fig 1. Payment rates over time. Decay in payment rates after email sent for control and treatment groups.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0177354.g001
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our sample. The remaining may be late payers for several reasons, such as being international
students who are not able to take out loans, students who decide not to take out loans, or stu-
dents that simply don’t have the financial means to pay the fees. They may also be dependent
on others to pay the fees whose behaviour they cannot control, such as parents, or a funding
body that does not have a regular payment schedule. In summary, in addition to limited access
to normative information, students are also likely to face budget and logistic constraints.
The effectiveness of social norms interventions depends on a population having a shared
sense of what is the desirable form of behaviour. In heterogeneous populations, like the one in
this study, this shared identity may not exist and anti-conformist bias may emerge, in which
people prefer not to conform to the social norm as they don’t identify with the wider group
[26, 27]. While we have not been able to define the reason behind the lack of impact of provid-
ing feedback on the normative behaviour in this context, our study highlights how social
norms don’t always work, and the importance of determining the appropriate contexts where
they may be effective.
Appendix
Treatment email
Student ID: 010207306–11/Nov/2013
Dear Student Name,
Your UCL Time Limited Enrolment has expired and our records show that you have not
paid sufficient fees or provided the required sponsorship evidence to complete the enrolment
process. The balance now due is £2,375.00.
OVER 90% OF UCL STUDENTS HAVE ALREADY PAID.
PLEASE PAY THE AMOUNT DUE NOW.
The easiest way to pay is on-line via the UCL website.
You can ask somebody to do this for you but they will need your Student Number (shown
above). Alternatively, we accept payments by credit/debit card (sorry, no Amex, Electron or
Diners Club), Bank transfer and UK Sterling Cheque. Full details of how and where to pay can
be found at the Student Fees website
IF YOU FAIL TO ACT WITHIN THE NEXT TEN (10) WORKING DAYS WE WILL
START TO APPLY SANCTIONS THAT WILL RESULT IN YOU BEING DENIED ACCESS
TO SPECIFIC SERVICES & FACILITIES AND SUSPENSION OF YOUR REGISTRATION
MAY THEN FOLLOW.
Students in debt to UCL are also to be prevented from attending a graduation ceremony,
receiving official notification of results and being awarded their degree. If you have recently
paid or provided sponsorship evidence, your Portico account will soon be updated. We advise
that you check your Portico Account on a regular basis. If you forwarded evidence of external
sponsorship (employer, government embassy etc) to UCL around the start of session that is
not recorded on Portico, please email another copy to fees@ucl.ac.uk ensuring the email sub-
ject is "Evidence of Sponsorship". If you enrolled for the 2013/14 session on a Time Limited
basis, this is the second email reminder that has been sent to your UCL account.
Please accept our apologies if you have received this email in error in which case you must
contact Student Fees office (details below) as a matter of urgency to resolve this matter.
Any enquiries should be directed to the Student Fees Office by telephone or in person. The
office is open for personal callers Monday to Friday from 10am to 4pm.
University College London,
Student Fees & Credit Control Section
Gower Street
Social norms don’t always work
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London, WC1E 6BT
Tel: +44 (0)20 7679 4125 or 4128
Control email
Student ID: 010207306–11/Nov/2013
Dear Student Name,
Your UCL Time Limited Enrolment has expired and our records show that you have not
paid sufficient fees or provided the required sponsorship evidence to complete the enrolment
process. The balance now due is £2,375.00.
PLEASE PAY THE AMOUNT DUE NOW.
The easiest way to pay is on-line via the UCL website.
You can ask somebody to do this for you but they will need your Student Number (shown
above). Alternatively, we accept payments by credit/debit card (sorry, no Amex, Electron or
Diners Club), Bank transfer and UK Sterling Cheque. Full details of how and where to pay can
be found at the Student Fees website
IF YOU FAIL TO ACT WITHIN THE NEXT TEN (10) WORKING DAYS WE WILL
START TO APPLY SANCTIONS THAT WILL RESULT IN YOU BEING DENIED ACCESS
TO SPECIFIC SERVICES & FACILITIES AND SUSPENSION OF YOUR REGISTRATION
MAY THEN FOLLOW.
Students in debt to UCL are also to be prevented from attending a graduation ceremony,
receiving official notification of results and being awarded their degree. If you have recently
paid or provided sponsorship evidence, your Portico account will soon be updated. We advise
that you check your Portico Account on a regular basis. If you forwarded evidence of external
sponsorship (employer, government embassy etc) to UCL around the start of session that is
not recorded on Portico, please email another copy to fees@ucl.ac.uk ensuring the email sub-
ject is "Evidence of Sponsorship". If you enrolled for the 2013/14 session on a Time Limited
basis, this is the second email reminder that has been sent to your UCL account.
Please accept our apologies if you have received this email in error in which case you must
contact Student Fees office (details below) as a matter of urgency to resolve this matter.
Any enquiries should be directed to the Student Fees Office by telephone or in person. The
office is open for personal callers Monday to Friday from 10am to 4pm.
University College London,
Student Fees & Credit Control Section
Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
Tel: +44 (0)20 7679 4125 or 4128
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